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Abstract
This paper analyzes the strategic implications for criminal trial of the
existence of the famous Miranda Right to Silence in U.S. law doctrine.
The right confers to the defendant the privilege that, in the context of
a signalling game, i. e. the trial, no adverse conclusions may be drawn
from his exercise of the right. It is shown that Miranda reduces wrongful
confessions and convictions, at the price, however, of setting free guilty
defendants as well. The rate of silence is aﬀected only when conﬁdence
for the respect of the right is perfect; otherwise guilty defendants prefer to
pool with innocent ones at declaring themselves innocent.
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Introduction
TheMiranda Rights is probably one of the most well-known institutions of Amer-
ican law doctrine. Every child knows it from the daily session in front of televi-
sion, where in virtually any police thriller it is read to the suspect while getting
handcuﬀed and led away. Miranda, besides of guaranteeing legal defence to a
suspect, confers to him the `right to silence', meaning that he need not make any
statements to police, prosecutors, and not even to the court: exercizing the right
means that interrogation has to end.
There has been an ongoing debate in the U.S. over the last fourty years about
the implications of the introduction of the Miranda Rights in 1966. Most of the
discussion centers around the eﬀectiveness of criminal investigation and crime
clearance rates. Without Miranda, a suspect or defendant could be subjected to
interrogation even when not wanting to talk to the authorities, and it is believed
by some that subtle coercive and persuasive techniques could induce one or the
other rightful confession  and, hopefully, no wrongful one. From the empirical
point of view, a large majority of legal and social science analysts seem to have
come to the conclusion that introduction of Miranda has initially caused some
moderate decreases in confession and conviction rates, but along the years the
impact seems to have diminished.1
It may be illuminating to look at these issues from the perspective of game
theory. We will address in this paper the eﬀects of the `right to silence' for
criminal trial. The right then is an alternative option to making a statement
about what really is of interest  guilt or innocence. From the strategic point of
view, respect for the right forces the juri to not use the fact of silence as such as a
pretext for presumption of guilt, but to rely on either prior evidence, that is (and
should be) known to all parties at the time trial begins, or evidence that may
manifest itself during proceedings. There is, however, considerable uncertainty
as to whether this right is always respected by juris, even if properly instructed
by the judge. Therefore, the defendant, when deciding whether to remain silent,
faces considerable uncertainty, being forced to trade oﬀ the beneﬁts of a reduced
sentence for confession against the advantage that the right to silence may oﬀer
 to guilty as well as innocent defendants.
We will look at the strategic situation from the viewpoint of signalling theory
(Spence(1973), Milgrom and Roberts (1986)) in a stylized model of court pro-
ceedings: a defendant may be guilty or innocent of a crime he has been accused
of. At the start of the trial, some evidence is known to all parties and all hold a
common prior as to the probability that this evidence shows that the defendant
is guilty. The defendant is asked for his plea, guilty or innocent, but he may
1For a contemporary review, see Leo (2001). A controversial debate of this issue has been
going on between Cassell (1996, 1998), on the one hand, and Schulhofer (1996), on the other.
For early evidence, see Seeburger and Wettick (1967).
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also exercise his right to stay quiet. Pleading guilty entitles to a lesser sentence
but instant conviction. During trial new information enters the scene,2 that, as
such, either reveals the defendant's type or is inconclusive. Both possibilities
occur with certain commonly known probabilities. In case of inconclusiveness,
the juri may use the prior probability for ﬁnding the verdict  but it may also
draw conclusions from the defendants initial statement. We will then examine
two regimes: either the juri is allowed to use unrestrictedly its (rational) beliefs,
or it restricts itself, with certain probability, to not use, at information sets where
the defendant is silent, any inference to his disadvantage. In the latter case the
verdict is reached by using the commonly known prior evidence only.
The only closely related literature from law-and-economics literature is Sei-
dmann (2005). There exist some common points with his analysis but as many
diﬀerences. In Seidmann's article the defendant can be one of several innocent
types and one guilty type. The guilty type sees his probability of being guilty
always increased after a key witness is heard since he is always confused by the
latter with exactly one of the innocent types. An innocent type is identiﬁed with
certain probability, whereas with inverse probability he just is confused with the
guilty one. In our paper the witness knows or does not know, and it reports this
fact truthfully to court. Seidmann assumes the particular setting in which inno-
cent types always tell the truth. Given that wrongful confession and silence by
innocent defendants are far from being a remote possibility, our approach is more
general in this respect since all types of defendants are assumed to have the same
strategic options, and decision to use them is endogenous. As results from our
analysis emerge, we will have a closer look at the diﬀerences in the implications
of both approaches.
The framework of our model is presented in Section 1. The results for the
most interesting cases of parameter constellations are discussed in Section 2. A
complete characterization of all Perfect Bayesian Equilibria is provided in the
Appendix. Section 3 summarizes the results and looks at some avenues for future
research in the area.
1 Framework
We imagine an idealized framework of a court proceeding, with the defendant
ﬁrst being asked to make his plea. Then a witness is heard, and ﬁnally, the juri
gives its verdict.
The defendant may be guilty, G, or innocent, I, being the a-priori probability
of the G-type pG ∈ (0, 1) and that of the I-type pI = 1− pG. He may send one of
three possible signals from the set {G,Q, I}, with the possibility to use a mixed
2This could be a new witness, or a known witness that reveals new information. It could
also be some new scientiﬁc method, say a state-of-the-art forensic test, for example.
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strategy. G and I, of course, mean statement of guilt and innocence, respectively,
whereas Q denotes the defendant exercizing his right to remain silent. Admission
of guilt ends the trial, with the defendant being convicted to some sentence that
is lesser than the one received when convicted without confession. One can think
of the punishment as being implied by some prior plea bargain between defence
and prosecution.
After the signal is sent, and the defendant has not confessed, the witness is
heard. We assume that the witness knows of guiltyness or innocence of the de-
fendant with probability r, whereas with probability 1− r he is not informed. In
either case, the witness truthfully reveals the respective fact to the juri. The juri,
after having observed the signal and the witness' statement, decides about acquit-
tal, A, or conviction, C, of the defendant. If the witness claims to be informed,
then the juri decides correspondingly without further inference, disregarding any
statement made by the defendant. For the case of an uninformed witness, the
juri will engage in Bayesian inference and form its beliefs.
Concerning the juri's verdict, after the witness has revealed its ignorance, we
will analyze two diﬀerent sets of rules:
(A) In order to decide about conviction or acquittal, the juri can use arbitrary
beliefs at any information set.
(B) In order to make the same decision, the juri honors with probability s the
right of the defendant to be silent (signal Q), in the following sense:
(i) If signal Q is oﬀ the equilibrium path, then a-priori probability pG
must be used for decision making.
(ii) If signal Q is on the equilibrium path, then the lower one of the two
probabilities, p(G|Q) or pG, must be used for decision making.3
With probability 1−s the juri just has the same freedom as in (A) to choose
its beliefs.
In both settings, the rational jury will do correct Bayesian updating, of course,
and it uses these updates in setting (A), together with unrestricted beliefs at
information sets oﬀ the equilibrium path, for coming to a verdict. In setting (B),
however, although rational as well, the jury will not always use the updates, or ar-
bitrary beliefs oﬀ equilibrium, for decision making: at information set Q decision
is limited by rules (i) and (ii). So the juri compromises, with certain probability,
not to use its rational inference, or arbitrary conjectures oﬀ-equilibrium, against
the G(-uilty) type of defendant if he chooses to be silent. On the other hand,
favourable inference to the beneﬁt of the I(-nnocent) type is not hampered.
3In Seidmann (2005) each innocent type just claims his type. Therefore, requirement (ii) is
not required in his analysis.
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Payoﬀs for the two suspect types are as follows: both types earn a direct
payoﬀ from acquittal of 0, a < 0 if convicted after having confessed, and b, with
b < a, if convicted without confession. The relatively more moderate punishment
a is traditionally meant to give an incentive to the defendant to come forward
with the truth (probably also in order to save the juri's and judge's time). For
the I-type of defendant we make the assumption that he earns an additional
non-pecuniary payoﬀ from either saying the truth, I, being quiet, Q, or wrongly
admitting guilt, G, of 0, δQ and δG, respectively, with δG < δQ < 0. This captures
the idea that `good guys' feel like telling the truth and only the truth, whereas
the `bad guys' do not care.
Payoﬀ for the juri depends on making the correct decision. It derives the
highest payoﬀ, c > 0, if it convicts the G-type of defendant. Payoﬀ for acquitting
the I-type, d > 0, is not greater than c. Acquitting the G-type gives a payoﬀ of
e < 0. The worst situation is to convict the innocent I-type, giving a payoﬀ f
strictly lower than the former one. So we assume
f < e < 0 < d ≤ c. (1)
We denote by pjA and p
j
C the probabilities of acquittal and conviction, respec-
tively, after the jury hears one of the two statements by the defendant, j = Q, I
and in case of an inconclusive testimony. Obviously, pjA + p
j
C = 1. We denote
by ρ = {(pjA, pjC)}j=Q,I the mixed strategy of the juri. As to the defendant, we
denote by qij the probability of sending signal j = G,Q, I when type is i = G, I.
Obviously, we have qiG + q
i
Q + q
i
I = 1.
In the following we will look at the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991a, 1991b)) for this signalling model (Spence (1973)) and work
out the diﬀerences that might emerge for the two regimes of juri behaviour.
2 Results
A thorough analysis of all equilibria is given in the Appendix. In this section we
will look at the most interesting cases where diﬀerences between the two regimes
potentially may be most accentuated.
Observe that the following behaviour makes part of this game:
1. If the type of the defendant is revealed by the witness, then type G is
convicted, type I acquitted.
2. If the juri is not informed, then it is indiﬀerent between acquittal and
conviction iﬀ
p˜∗G · c+ (1− p˜∗G) · f != p˜∗G · e+ (1− p˜∗G) · d
⇔ p˜∗G =
d− f
(c− e) + (d− f) < 1, (2)
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where p˜G is the juri's belief that it faces the G(uilty)-type of defendant at
a certain information set.
First of all, in any rational solution of the game, for a > rb the worst that may
happen to type G when sending signal G is strictly better than the best that can
happen to him with any of the other choices.4 So G would always stick with G,
and type I, by the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps (1987)), should therefore
always send signal I. The `rebate' from making a confession is suﬃciently high
to warrant the G(-uilty) type to accept it. For a = rb signal G weakly dominates
anything else from type G's perspective, with payoﬀ a only being matched in
case that he is always acquitted with any of the other options. Also in this case
it appears reasonable to assume that he would stick to option G  only to be
sure  and then type I would again be best-oﬀ with signal I. We will exclude
these trivial cases from further analysis and instead concentrate on the interesting
one, a < rb, where potentially pooling of the two types may occur  with the
possibility that the two regimes for juri behaviour imply diﬀerent results.
A-Priori Strong Evidence: pG > p˜
∗
G
If pG > p˜
∗
G then there is strong enough evidence for conviction prior to hearing the
witness, and when the answer of the witness is not informative, then, unless the
signalling framework is revealing, a-priori information is used by the juri when
coming to a decision.
It is quite clear that, for this case, Perfect Bayesian Equilibria are the same
for both sets of rules guiding the juri: if an outcome can be sustained as an
equilibrium with rule (A), then, if information set Q is oﬀ-equilibrium, the belief
p(G|Q) > p˜∗G sustains this equilibrium, and so does pG > p˜∗G for rule (B). If
Q is on the equilibrium path, then, if p(G|Q) ≥ p˜∗G, also min{p(G|Q), pG} ≥
p˜∗G. If p(G|Q) < p˜∗G we have min{p(G|Q), pG} = p(G|Q), implying the same
consequence in (B) as in (A). On the other hand, looking at an equilibrium
for rule (B), it is clear that it also goes through in (A) because, for Q being oﬀ
equilibrium, choosing p(G|Q) > p˜∗G has the same implication as pG > p˜∗G, and with
Q on the equilibrium path, choosing in setting (A) the same rationally updated
beliefs as in (B) has the same consequences and creates the same incentives for
the defendant. We can then state the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The following Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in mixed strategies ex-
ist for a < rb and pG > p˜
∗
G:
(i) Pooling (G,G). Necessary condition: δG ≥ (1− r)b− a.
4Recall that r is the probability of being identiﬁed by the witness.
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(ii) Semi-Pooling ((G,Q), Q), with G-type defendant mixing with qGQ =
(1−pG)p˜∗G
pG(1−p˜∗G)
,
and juri mixing with (pQC , p
I
C) = (
a/b−r
1−r , 1) if witness report is inconclusive.
Necessary condition: δQ ≥ b− a.5
(iii) Semi-Pooling ((G, I), I), with G-type defendant mixing with qGI =
(1−pG)p˜∗G
pG(1−p˜∗G)
,
and juri mixing with (pQC , p
I
C) = (1,
a/b−r
1−r ) if witness report is inconclusive.
Equilibria are identical for both sets of juri rules, (A) and (B).
Proof: For equilibrium (i), (ii) and (iii), see Lemma 1, Lemma 10 and Lemma
11, respectively, in the Appendix.
Note that equilibrium type (iii) does always exist, whereas the other two
disappear if the cost for the innocent type, I, of lying, δG, and of being silent,
Q, δQ, respectively, are too high. In the latter case, type I always sticks with
the truth, but he cannot distinguish himself completely from the G(-uilty) guy
(because a < rb) who chooses, with strictly positive probability, but not always,
to mimic the innocent one. Therefore, the guilty are not always convicted and
the innocent not always acquitted.
Now suppose that costs of being silent for the I-type become lower, such that
δQ ≥ b−a, so that equilibrium type (ii) appears. Clearly (ii) and (iii) are similar,
with the unique diﬀerence being the costs of being silent imposed on the innocent
type. From the point of view of equilibrium selection we would therefore expect
that the Pareto-dominant, and not riskier, equilibrium (iii) be selected.
Finally, if δG ≥ (1− r)b− a, equilibrium type (i) becomes available  type I
feels the cost of not telling the truth as lower as the beneﬁt of a reduced sentence.
Note also that an additional necessary condition for existence is r < 0.5,6 i.e. the
probability of the witness revealing the truth must not be too high. This is
because a higher probability of revelation pegs the guilty type to G, and then the
innocent one can choose his most preferred option I without fear of being mixed
up with the guilty type. Clearly, equilibrium (i) is the worst for both types since
both are always convicted, so equilibrium type (i) is strictly dominated for each
type of defendant by either (ii) or (iii). Nevertheless, with equilibrium types (ii)
and (iii) there is, of course, a risk of getting a heavier-handed sentence in the
worst case. So equilibrium type (i) is the less risky.
Nevertheless, independently of undoubtedly interesting questions of equilib-
rium selection, from the perspective of the issue that has motivated our analysis,
we can state that for strong a-priori evidence there is no diﬀerence for the two
juri rules under consideration.
5Note that this type of equilibrium does not show up in Seidmann (2005) because in his
interpretation of the Miranda Right, pG > p˜
∗
G must always be used at Q to decide over acquittal
or conviction (which implies conviction in this case).
6This follows from a < rb and (1 − r)b − a < 0. The latter is necessary to guarantee
δG ≥ (1− r)b− a.
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A-Priori Weak Evidence: pG < p˜
∗
G
In this case equilibria for both sets of rules may be diﬀerent because, even with
beliefs indicating the G-type at information set Q, the defendant is not always
convicted. We can state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The following Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in mixed strategies ex-
ist for a < rb and pG < p˜
∗
G:
(i) Pooling (G,G). Necessary condition: (A) δG ≥ (1 − r)b − a, (B) δG ≥
(1− r)b− a and s ≤ 1− δG−δQ
(1−r)b .
(ii) Pooling (Q,Q) with juri acquitting when witness report is inconclusive. Nec-
essary condition: δQ ≥ (1− r)b for both, (A) and (B).
(iii) Separating (Q, I) with juri acquitting at both, Q and I, when witness report
is inconclusive. Necessary condition: Only for rule set (B) and s = 1.
(iv) Pooling (I, I) with juri acquitting when witness report is inconclusive. Same
for (A) and (B).
Proof: For equilibrium (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv), see Lemma 1, 5, 6 and 7, respec-
tively, in the Appendix.
Let us once more start our analysis with the case of excessively high costs for
not telling the truth and for being silent, δG < (1 − r)b − a and δQ < (1 − r)b.
In this case, only equilibria of types (iii) and (iv) can exist. Type (iii) is possible
only if the right to silence is perfectly respected. In fact, in this case, the bad
guy ousts himself as such by the signal sent, but he cannot be convicted because
of his silence. It seems that having the right to silence makes it conceivable to
separate the types  without being able to convict the bad guys, though.
Now let us suppose that the costs for the innocent type of being silent and
of lying are suﬃciently low to allow him to consider Q and G as well as possible
statements. Then also equilibria (i) and (ii) become available. Equilibrium type
(ii) is Pareto-dominated by (iv) because the latter does not impose the cost of
lying on the innocent type. Moreover (iv) is not riskier than (ii). So we may
eliminate (ii).
For rule set (A), and for (B) with the right to silence not too much respected,
equilibrium (i) is also Pareto-dominated by (iv), but the latter is also riskier: in
the worst case, both types could get convicted if witness or juri make an error.
Therefore, it is not so clear which one of the two should be selected. In fact, both
equilibria may have been around in reality before the surpreme court introduced
the Miranda Rights. However, an increasing respect for the right (s → 1) has
eliminated equilibrium (i), leaving (iii) and (iv)  meaning that less wrongful
confessions, and convictions, occur, at the price, however, of a lower conviction
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rate and expected punishment for guilty defendants. This theoretical result is
consistent with empirical evidence discussed in Cassell and Fowles (1998), among
others. At the same time, it also gives an endogenous explanation of Seidmann's
(2005) assumption that innocent types always say the truth. Seidmann also
reports that, after the introduction of the Criminal Justice Act in 1994 in Great
Britain which allows juries "... to draw an adverse inference from a suspect's
refusal to answer some material questions" (p. 605), the confession rate did not
signiﬁcantly change, but the silence rate went down signiﬁcantly. A decrease in
the silence rate is consistent with the disappearance of equilibrium (iii) as soon
as the slightest hint appears that silence might be interpreted by the juri as tacit
admission of guilt. On the other hand, an unchanged confession rate is consistent
with a slight increase in the juri's propensity to interpret silence as admission of
guilt: as long as s > 1 − δG−δQ
(1−r)b , equilibrium (i) does not emerge, and having
the option to draw inferences from silence does not mean necessarily that juris
automatically use it  at least if they are suﬃciently intelligent to understand the
signalling context in which they are embedded.
Why would society be interested in having the Miranda Right to Silence in
the ﬁrst place? Suppose that the ordering of alternatives by the juri, (1), were the
social ordering. Ex-ante expected social welfare for the two equilibria then would
be WG = pGc+ (1− pG)f and W I = pG[rc+ (1− r)e] + (1− pG)d for pooling on
G and on I, respectively. Welfare turns out to be higher for pooling equilibrium
(I, I) if the disutility from convicting an innocent citizen is suﬃciently high.7 Of
course, with this moral burden one is better-oﬀ setting him free, although at the
price that the same happens with the bad guy when he cannot be identiﬁed by the
witness. The Miranda Right to Silence just accomplishes this task by removing
pooling equilibrium (G,G) from the scene.
3 Conclusion
This paper has illustrated the strategic implications of the `right to silence' for
criminal trial in the context of modern U.S. law doctrine and has given the
best explanation until now for empirical observations. Unlike in contemporary
English law culture and before the Miranda decision, no adverse inferences may
be drawn from the silence of a defendant. In case of weak a-priori evidence, the
important consequence from the introduction of the right is a reduction in the
rate of wrongful confession and implied conviction, but also guilty defendants are
more likely to be set free, and their expected punishment decreases. Creating
this combination of contrary eﬀects may well be an intentional desire by society,
7Note that W I > WG iﬀ (1 − pG)(d − f) > pG(1 − r)(c − e). Furthermore, from (2) we
deduce
∂p˜∗G
∂(d−f) > 0. Therefore, one can always guarantee pG < p˜
∗
G when decreasing f because
p˜∗G increases.
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and the surpreme court's decision, as well as its continuing conﬁrmation and
strengthening of the right, could just reﬂect this intention.
On the other hand, with much progress made in forensic science over the last
decades, it appears that a-priori guilt or innocence can be established with much
more accuracy than before  even without a suspect's collaboration  meaning
that he will be cited in front of court only if guilt seems very likely. Moreover,
pressure has grown over police and prosecution to make their cases as `bulletproof'
as possible. In this case, when initial evidence grows stronger, the existence or not
of the Miranda Right does not make any diﬀerence. Empirical evidence supports
the implications of this view: as reported by Leo (2001), most legal and social
science analysts agree that for some years after the introduction of Miranda,
confession and conviction rates have slightly decreased, but thereafter the eﬀect
seems to have vanished.
It might be interesting for further research to extend the setting from trial to
the preceeding stage of criminal investigation, where the Miranda Right already
is in full eﬀect, but potential for exploiting alternative sources of information
about the case is higher than during trial phase. In this context it could also
be worthwhile to incorporate the Miranda Right into an analysis of a framework
where the defendant can potentially actively contribute to the ﬁnding of truth
by transmitting information that may be corraborated with certain probability
by an independent witness, say. This would allow one to look at some interesting
questions, for example, how does the right to silence perform in a situation where
an innocent defendant could increase the likelihood of his guilt when transmitting
correct information to police or the court.
Epilogue
On March 13, 1963, $8.00 in cash was stolen from a Phoenix, Arizona bank
worker. Police suspected and arrested Ernesto Miranda for committing the theft.
During several hours of questioning, Mr. Miranda, who was never oﬀered a
lawyer, confessed not only to the $8.00 theft, but also to kidnapping and raping
an 18-year-old woman 11 days earlier. Based largely on his confession, Miranda
was convicted and sentenced to twenty to thirty years in jail.
Miranda's attorneys appealed. First unsuccessfully to the Arizona Supreme
Court, and next to the U.S. Supreme Court. On June 13, 1966, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in deciding the case of MIRANDA v. ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
reversed the Arizona Court's decision, granted Miranda a new trial at which his
confession could not be admitted as evidence, and established the "Miranda"
rights of persons accused of crimes.
Ernesto Miranda was given a second trial at which his confession was not
presented. Based on the evidence, Miranda was again convicted of kidnapping
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and rape. He was paroled from prison in 1972 having spent 11 years of his life in
jail.
In 1976, Ernesto Miranda, at age of 34, was stabbed to death in a ﬁght. Police
arrested a suspect who, after choosing to exercise his Miranda right of silence,
was released.
Source: Court TV's Crime Library,
http://www.crimelibrary.com/notorious_murders/not_guilty/miranda/
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Appendix
In this appendix we turn to the identiﬁcation of all equilibria in pure and mixed
strategies. From the methodological point of view we iterate through all possible
strategies of defendant-type G, then for those of type I, and ﬁnally those of the
juri, ﬁtting them together as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if it is possible. For
this purpose, we always choose a belief of facing the guilty guy at any information
set oﬀ the equilibrium path. This belief, of course, cannot always be used in
setting (B) for the purpose of determining conviction or aquittal.
1) G uses G
I chooses G (Pooling Equilibrium (G,G)): Payoﬀ for type G is a, for type
I it is a+ δG. We have to distinguish the two regimes:
(A) Type G neither deviates to Q nor to I because b < a. Type I does not
deviate to Q iﬀ (1− r)b+ δQ ≤ a+ δG, i.e. δG − δQ ≥ (1− r)b− a (a). He
won't choose I iﬀ (1− r)b ≤ a + δG, i.e. δG ≥ (1− r)b− a (b). Note that
(b) implies (a).
(B) For pG > p˜
∗
G, the same applies as in (A) because at Q there can always be
conviction in regime (B). For pG ≤ p˜∗G, the juri acquitts with respect for the
right to silence. Then typeG does not deviate toQ iﬀ rb+(1−r)(1−s)b ≤ a,
i.e. s ≤ 1 − a/b−r
1−r (a). He won't choose I because b < a. As to type I, he
does not deviate to Q iﬀ (1− r)(1− s)b+ δQ ≤ a+ δG, i.e. s ≤ 1− a+δG−δQ(1−r)b
(b), and I isn't attractive for him iﬀ (1−r)b ≤ a+δG, i.e. δG ≥ (1−r)b−a.
Note that (b) implies (a).
These results can be gathered in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 A pooling equilibrium (G,G) does exist
(A) iﬀ δG ≥ (1− r)b− a.
(B) iﬀ δG ≥ (1− r)b− a. For pG > p˜∗G no further conditions are required. For
pG ≤ p˜∗G we additionally require s ≤ 1− a+δG−δQ(1−r)b .
In all cases, besides of the restrictions of setting (B), out-of-equilibrium beliefs
are chosen such that the juri convicts the defendant at the respective information
set.
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I chooses Q (Separating Equilibrium (G,Q)): Payoﬀ for type G is a. For
type I, who is the only one possible at information set Q, payoﬀ is δQ. We do
not need to distinguish the two legal regimes. Type G does not deviate to Q iﬀ
rb ≤ a, and he never deviates to I because b < a. As to type I, he won't go for
G because a+ δG ≤ δQ, and he wouldn't choose I iﬀ δQ ≥ (1− r)b. Hence:
Lemma 2 A separating equilibrium (G,Q) exists iﬀ rb ≤ a and δQ ≥ (1 − r)b.
It is the same for rules (A) and (B). Out-of-equilibrium beliefs are chosen such
that the juri convicts the defendant at information set I.
I chooses I (Separating Equilibrium (G,I)): Payoﬀ for type G is a, for
type I it is 0. We have to distinguish the two regimes:
(A) Type G does not deviate to Q because b < a, and I is not attractive for
him iﬀ rb ≤ a. Type I under no circumstances deviates because he obtains
his maximum of 0.
(B) For pG > p˜
∗
G the same as in (A) applies. For pG ≤ p˜∗G, type G does not
deviate to Q iﬀ rb+(1− r)(1− s)b ≤ a, i.e. s ≤ 1− a/b−r
1−r . He won't choose
I iﬀ rb ≤ a. As in (A), type I never deviates. Therefore:
Lemma 3 A separating equilibrium (G, I) does exist in (A) iﬀ rb ≤ a. For
setting (B), and for pG ≤ p˜∗G, we additionally require s ≤ 1− a/b−r1−r .
In all cases, besides of the restrictions of setting (B), out-of-equilibrium beliefs
are chosen such that the juri convicts the defendant at the respective information
set.
I chooses a strictly mixed strategy: This strategy cannot include I because
he would get strictly more than with the other alternatives. Also (G,Q) together
is not possible because a+ δG < δQ. Therefore, no such mixing is possible.
2) G uses Q
I uses G (Separating Equilibrium (Q,G)): We have to distinguish the two
settings. (A) Payoﬀ for type G is b, for type I it is a + δG. G deviates to G
because there he obtains a. (B) Two cases must be distinguished:
(i) pG > p˜
∗
G (juri convicts): Same case as in (A), with type G deviating.
(ii) pG ≤ p˜∗G (juri acquits): Payoﬀ for type G is b[r + (1 − r)(1 − s)], for type
I it is a + δG. Type G does not deviate to G iﬀ a ≤ b[r + (1 − r)(1 − s)],
i.e. s ≥ 1 − a/b−r
1−r , and I isn't worthwhile either. As to type I, he won't
deviate to Q iﬀ (1 − r)(1 − s)b + δQ ≤ a + δG, i.e. s ≤ 1 − a/b−(δG−δQ)/b1−r .
This requires δG− δQ ≥ (1− r)b− a. I won't go for I iﬀ δG ≥ (1− r)b− a.
Therefore we can state the following lemma.
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Lemma 4 In setting (B) a separating equilibrium (Q, I) exists iﬀ rb ≤ a, pG ≤
p˜∗G, δG ≥ (1− r)b− a, and s ∈ [1− a/b−r1−r , 1− a/b−(δG−δQ)/b1−r ].
In all cases, besides of the restrictions of setting (B), out-of-equilibrium beliefs
are chosen such that the juri convicts the defendant at the respective information
set.
I uses Q (Pooling Equilibrium (Q,Q)): It is irrelevant whether we are in
setting (A) or (B) because p(G|Q) = pG. Three cases must be distinguished.
i) pG ≥ p˜∗G (juri convicts): Payoﬀ for G is b, for I it is (1− r)b+ δQ. But then
type G is better-oﬀ with G.
ii) pG ≤ p˜∗G (juri acquits): Payoﬀ for G is rb, for I it is δQ. Type G does not
deviate to G iﬀ a ≤ rb. He won't deviate to I at all because with that he
receives b. Type I does not deviate to G because a+ δG < δQ. He will not
choose I iﬀ (1− r)b ≤ δQ.
iii) pG = p˜
∗
G (juri mixes C and A): Type G's payoﬀ is [r + (1 − r)pQC ]b, that
of type I is (1 − r)pQCb + δQ. G does not deviate to G as long as a ≤
b[r+(1− r)pQC ] or pQC ≤ a/b−r1−r (a). This requires a ≤ br. G does not deviate
to I either because he would earn b only. As to type I, he does not deviate
to G iﬀ a + δG ≤ (1 − r)pQCb + δQ i.e. pQC ≤ a+δG−δQ(1−r)b (b). Not having him
deviate to I requires (1 − r)b ≤ (1 − r)pQCb + δQ, i.e. pQC ≤ (1−r)b−δQ(1−r)b (c).
Note that (a) implies (b).
We can state these results in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 A class of pooling equilibria (Q,Q) does exist iﬀ a ≤ rb, pG ≤ p˜∗G and
δQ ≥ (1 − r)b are fulﬁlled simultaneously. In the pure-strategy equilibrium the
defendant is acquitted in equilibrium. For pG = p˜
∗
G, and with δQ > (1 − r)b and
a < br, the juri may use a mixed strategy, with pQC ∈ (0,min{ (1−r)b−δQ(1−r)b , a/b−r1−r }].
Out-of-equilibrium beliefs are chosen such that the juri convicts the defendant at
information sets G and I. Equilibria are identical for settings (A) and (B).
I uses I (Separating Equilibrium (Q,I)): (A) This cannot be an equilib-
rium because type G would deviate to I. (B) This cannot be an equilibrium
either, unless for pG ≤ p˜∗G, a ≤ rb and s = 1.
Lemma 6 A separating equilibrium (Q, I) does exist only in setting (B) and for
pG ≤ p˜∗G, a ≤ rb and s = 1.
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I chooses a strictly mixed strategy: It is not possible to have type I use I
in a strict mix because he is identiﬁed, and then he earns strictly more than with
any other option. So it remains to look at (G,Q). Because of I's indiﬀerence, we
must have a+δG = (1−r)pQCb, i.e. pQC = a+δG(1−r)b . For this we need δG ≥ (1−r)b−a.
This implies tht type G in Q earns rb+(1− r) a+δG
(1−r)bb = rb+ a+ δG. But then he
should use G. Therefore, this is not possible in equilibrium.
3) G uses I
I uses G (Separating Equilibrium (I,G)): This cannot be an equilibrium
in neither settings, because type G would deviate to G.
I uses Q (Separating Equilibrium (I,Q)): This cannot be an equilibrium
in neither settings, because type G would deviate to G.
I uses I (Pooling Equilibrium (I,I)): For the two setting, the following
applies:
(A) i) pG ≥ p˜∗G (juri convicts): Type G would obviously deviate to G.
ii) pG ≤ p˜∗G (juri acquits): Payoﬀ for G is rb, for I it is 0. Type G does
not deviate to G iﬀ a ≤ rb. He won't deviate to Q at all because with
that he receives b. Type I does not deviate to G because a+ δG < 0.
He won't choose Q either because (1− r)b+ δQ < 0.
iii) pG = p˜
∗
G (juri mixes C and A): Payoﬀ for type G is b[r + (1 − r)pIC ],
for type I it is (1 − r)pICb. Type G won't deviate to G iﬀ pIC ≤ a/b−r1−r
(a). Note that this requires a ≤ rb. Under no circumstances will he
deviate to Q because of the lowest possible payoﬀ b. Type I does not
deviate to G iﬀ a+ δG ≤ (1− r)pICb, i.e. pIC ≤ a+δG(1−r)b (b), and under no
circumstances it would be of strict advantage to deviate to Q because
with it I would earn (1− r)b+ δQ only. Note that (a) implies (b).
(B) i) pG ≥ p˜∗G (juri convicts): Type G would obviously deviate to G.
ii) pG ≤ p˜∗G (juri acquits): Payoﬀ for G is rb, for I it is 0. Type G
does not deviate to G iﬀ a ≤ rb. He won't deviate to Q because
b[r + (1 − r)(1 − s)] ≤ rb. Type I does not deviate to G because
a+ δG < 0. He won't choose Q either because (1− r)(1−s)b+ δQ < 0.
iii) pG = p˜
∗
G (juri mixes C and A): Payoﬀ for type G is b[r+(1−r)pIC ], for
type I it is (1− r)pICb. Type G won't deviate to G iﬀ pIC ≤ a/b−r1−r (a).
Note that this requires a ≤ rb. He does not deviate to Q at all because
of earning b only. Type I does not deviate to G iﬀ a+δG ≤ (1−r)pICb,
i.e. pIC ≤ a+δG(1−r)b (b), and under no circumstances it would be of strict
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advantage to deviate to Q because with it I would earn (1− r)b+ δQ
only. Again note that (a) implies (b).
Lemma 7 A class of pooling equilibria (I, I) does exist for both settings, (A)
and (B), iﬀ pG ≤ p˜∗G and a ≤ rb. In the pure-strategy equilibrium (a = rb) the
defendant is acquitted in equilibrium. For pG = p˜
∗
G, and with a < rb, the juri may
use a mixed strategy with pIC ∈ (0, a/b−r1−r ]. In all cases, besides of the restrictions
of setting (B), out-of-equilibrium beliefs are chosen such that the juri convicts the
defendant at the respective information set.
I chooses a strictly mixed strategy: Given type G's supposed choice I,
option G cannot make part of type I's strategy because G had incentives to
deviate. Looking then at mixing between Q and I, we observe that, in this case,
the G-type would deviate to Q unless he is always acquitted in I. Note that this
argument holds for setting (B) because the supposed equilibrium would identify
the player who chooses Q as the G-type. Then, however, also type I would
strictly prefer I over Q. Therefore, no mixed strategy equilibrium can exist in
which type G chooses the pure strategy I.
4) G strictly mixes (G, Q, I)
For G's indiﬀerence between the three strategies we need a = rb + (1− r)pQCb =
rb + (1 − r)pICb, i.e. pQC = pIC = a/b−r1−r . This requires a ≤ rb. But then type
I should not use Q because in I he is convicted with the same probability, but
saves δQ. He shouldn't opt for G either because a+ δG < (1− r)a/b−r1−r b = a− br.
So it is only possible that type I chooses I. (A) Type G is identiﬁed in Q, so
he better went for G. (B) For pG > p˜
∗
G the same holds as in (A). For pG < p˜
∗
G
there should always be acquittal in I. In Q, however, there is acquittal only with
probability s. But then we need a = rb. For pG = p˜
∗
G, note that because type G
is strictly mixing, he cannot always choose I. But then there is acquittal in I,
but in Q not always, unless s = 1. Therefore, we can state the following lemma.
Lemma 8 A class of semi-pooling equilibria ((G,Q, I), I) does exist for setting
(B) iﬀ pG ≤ p˜∗G, a = rb and s = 1. The juri always acquits in Q and I.
5) G strictly mixes (G, Q)
I chooses I: (A) Type G is identiﬁed as such in Q and thus convicted. Then,
however, it is strictly better to choose G. So this cannot be an equilibrium.
(B) Although being identiﬁed in Q as type G, this type only will always be
convicted iﬀ pG > p˜
∗
G. But then G strictly prefers G. If pG ≤ p˜∗G, then he will
be acquitted with probability s and convicted with probability 1− s, leading to
payoﬀ b[r + (1 − r)(1 − s)] = a. This implies s = 1 − a/b−r
1−r . In I type G would
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earn rb, implying that deviation is not of strict advantage iﬀ a ≥ rb. Type I
earns 0 in I, so he strictly prefers this option over all alternatives.
Lemma 9 In setting (B) a separating equilibrium exists where type G strictly
mixes (G,Q) with any probability and type I chooses I iﬀ a ≥ rb, pG ≤ p˜∗G and
s = 1− a/b−r
1−r .
I chooses Q: (A) Since G is indiﬀerent between G and Q we must have a =
rb + (1 − r)pQCb, i.e. pQC = a/b−r1−r . This requires a ≤ rb. Payoﬀ for type I then
is (1 − r)pQCb + δQ = a − rb + δQ. Type G does not deviate to I because b < a.
Type I won't deviate to G because a + δG < a − br + δQ, and he won't choose
I iﬀ δQ ≥ b − a. If a = rb we have pQC = 0, and therefore p(G|Q) ≤ p˜∗G, i.e.
qGQ ≤ (1−pG)p˜
∗
G
pG(1−p˜∗G)
. If a < rb then pQC 6= 0, and the juri must be indiﬀerent between
conviction and acquittal. This requires p(G|Q) = p˜∗G, i.e. qGQ = (1−pG)p˜
∗
G
pG(1−p˜∗G)
. This
is only possible for pG ≥ p˜∗G. (B) Since p(G|Q) ≤ pG (because I always chooses
Q), and Q is on the equilibrium path, the juri always uses p(G|Q) as base of its
decision. Hence, the equilibrium is the same as in (A).
These results can be gathered in the following lemma.
Lemma 10 A class of semi-pooling equilibria exists, where type G mixes (G,Q)
and type I chooses Q iﬀ a ≤ rb and δQ ≥ b−a. The juri's strategy is (pGC , pQC , pIC) =
(1, a/b−r
1−r , 1), where the out-of-equilibrium belief p(G|I) = 1 supports pIC = 1. If
a = rb the G-type can use any mixed strategy with qGQ ∈
(
0,
(1−pG)p˜∗G
pG(1−p˜∗G)
)
. If a < rb
and pG ≥ p˜∗G the G-type uses mixed strategy qGQ = (1−pG)p˜
∗
G
pG(1−p˜∗G)
. This class coincides
for both settings, (A) and(B).
Note that technicaly qGQ = 0 is excluded here for a = rb because it makes part of
the corresponding pure-strategy equilibrium.
I chooses G: (A) We must have a = b for type G being indiﬀerent. This
contradicts a > b. (B) We require pQC =
a/b−r
1−r for G being indiﬀerent. Then I's
payoﬀ with Q is a− br + δQ which is higher than a+ δG with G. Therefore, this
cannot be an equilibrium.
I uses a strictly mixed strategy: This would mean that, when observing I,
the juri must acquit because only type I sends this signal. But then I is strictly
better-oﬀ with claiming I than with anything else. So only (G,Q) can possibly
occur in a strict mix. But both types cannot be simultaneously indiﬀerent be-
tween the two because I has still to bear δG or δQ, respectively. Therefore, this
cannot occur in an equilibrium.
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6) G strictly mixes (G, I)
I chooses G: This would require a = b for type G being indiﬀerent.
I chooses Q: This would require a = b for type G being indiﬀerent.
I chooses I: For type G being indiﬀerent, we need a = rb + (1 − r)pICb, i.e.
pIC =
a/b−r
1−r . This requires a ≤ rb. Payoﬀ for type I then is a − br. He does not
divert to G because a+ δG < a− br.
(A) In Q there is conviction, so both, G and I, won't deviate. (B) For pG ≥ p˜∗G
the same as in (A) applies. For pG < p˜
∗
G, we have p(G|I) < p˜∗G, so pIC should be
0, and this only works with a = br.
We can therefore state the following.
Lemma 11 A class of equilibria in strictly mixed strategies, with defendant type
G strictly mixing using (G, I) and type I choosing I exists iﬀ
(A) a ≤ rb. Any qGI ∈ (0, (1−pG)p˜GpG(1−p˜G) ] makes part of an equilibrium of this
class. For a < rb we require in addition pG ≥ p˜∗G, and in this case we
must have qGI =
(1−pG)p˜∗G
pG(1−p˜∗G)
. In both cases the juri's equilibrium strategy
is (pGC , p
Q
C , p
I
C) = (1, 1,
a/b−r
1−r ), where p
Q
C = 1 is supported by the out-of-
equilibrium belief p(G|Q) = 1.
(B) a ≤ rb. For pG ≥ p˜∗G the equilibrium is the same as in (A). For pG < p˜∗G,
in conjunction with a = rb, the equilibrium implies acquittal in I.
I uses a strictly mixed strategy: All three together are impossible because
in Q type I is acquitted, implying δQ = a+ δG, which is a contradiction. Mixing
G and Q leads to the same conclusion. For Q and I together, we must have
δQ = (1− r)pICb, i.e. pIC = δQ(1−r)b . Also, a = rb+ (1− r) δQ(1−r)bb = rb+ δQ. Hence,
δQ = a − rb, requiring a < rb. For type G not deviating to Q, we need rb ≤ a,
which then is a contradiction. Finally, simultaneous mixing of G and I by both
players is not possible due to the diﬀerent relative costs of those options for the
two. Therefore, no such equilibrium can exist.
7) G strictly mixes (Q, I)
I chooses G: In either setting type G would be identiﬁed as such and received
the maximum sentence in I. Therefore, he were strictly better with saying G.
Hence, this cannot be part of an equilibrium.
I chooses Q: By the same argument as before, this isn't an equilibrium either.
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I chooses I: (A) G is identiﬁed in Q as such and, therefore, would be better-
oﬀ choosing G. (B) For pG > p˜
∗
G type G is convicted in Q in any case. So he
should deviate to G. For pG ≤ p˜∗G there is acquittal in Q with probability s but
conviction with probability 1− s, leading to expected payoﬀ (1− s)b for type G.
Since type I is always supposed to choose I we have p(G|I) < pG ≤ p˜∗G leading
to acquittal in I. Hence, type G would better choose I.
I uses a strictly mixed strategy: It is not possible to have types I and
G simultaneously indiﬀerent between Q and I because of the diﬀerent relative
costs of these options. Therefore, only G and I, on the one hand, and G and Q,
on the other are possible. In both cases, however, we obtain a straightforward
contradiction.
This concludes the exhaustive analysis of existence of equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies.
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